Some teams surely set themselves up for success or failure based on the draft, but an enduring question of fantasy baseball is how much the final outcome depends on selecting the right players at the start versus in-season moves to bolster a roster. Since we already looked at which teams had the players that ‘outperformed’ or ‘underperformed’ the most, I thought it might be interest to look at which teams had the biggest discrepancy between the actual performance of their drafted players and the total stats of final roster.
If there were no bench slots, no free agent pick-ups and no trades, then the draft would be the only thing that mattered. The decisive winner of the Best Draft Award goes to the Madison Mohels (see Table 3). As discussed in Part I, the Mohels pursued a strategy of placing huge dollars with hitters and then only 20% of the budget to pitching. Since Roy Oswalt ($23) and Justin Verlander ($10) consumed most of that small pitching budget, the rest of the pen consisted of low cost starters under 30 years old who showed prior flashes of skill, including Jered Weaver ($5), Joe Saunders ($2), and Bronson Arroyo ($2). Adding to the pen were good rate-stat relievers Huston Street ($1) and Brandon Lyon ($1). To round things out, Chris Capuano ($1) and Bartolo Colon ($1) were thrown in to the mix. It is unclear if those were serious picks or part of the screwed up end-of-draft problems we experience in 2009 thanks to ESPN. I have doubts as Capuano never pitched that season due to injury and Colon is just really, really fat.
The low cost pitching strategy for the Mohels worked quite nicely, at least in comparison to everyone else. For a grand total of $19, the Mohels got 66 wins (see Table 4) from Weaver, Saunders, Arroyo and Verlander, which contributed to 8 points in that category. Only Owalt truly disappointed. And the rate stats followed as well (7 points for ERA, 9 points for WHIP, 6 points for K/BB). What was saved on pitching provided a wide margin of error for the hitters.
In 2009, only 54 players hit 20 or more home runs. Of those, nine went undrafted in our league. Yet, who among us regrets not drafting the 20-HR power of Shin-Shoo Chin? Those kinds of surprises are fairly common in baseball. However, if there was a pro rata distribution of power hitters on teams, everyone would have four, perhaps five, 20 HR hitters. The Mohels had eight players who combined for 246 HRs. That alone would have been good for 2nd place in HRs, except he had an additional five guys who added 74 HRs to that total. Runs and RBIs tend to go along with homers, and thus the Models soundly took 10 points in each category, with upper tier finishes in OBP and SBs. This was not a result of high risk bets, rather it was the intentional assembly of a murders row that consisted of Miguel Cabrera ($40), Jimmy Rollins ($28), Ryan Howard ($22), Carlos Lee ($27). Sure, the team received great, inexpensive performances by Mark Reynolds ($3 for 40 HRs) and Robinson Cano ($7 for 25 HRs at second base), but the hitting categories were won even without them.
Following the prior post, Dave commented that “If I had put a little more in-season elbow grease into it, I suspect I could have escaped the cellar into the low middle rangers.” Perhaps. Except, his drafted team was a full 10 points behind the Red Hook Misdemeanors. Dave’s team simply stunk like, well, Monkeys. With a couple of exceptions, every hitter and pitcher seemed to put up a disappointing, but not disastrous performance. Grady Sizemore ($37), Chase Utley ($29), Carlos Quentin ($15), Stephen Drew ($11), Matt Garza ($11) and Scott Kazmir ($10) simply each had a down year. This must be how Omar Minaya feels every year.
Looking through the entirety of the as-drafted standings, what is clear is how much working the waiver wire can help. As we explored earlier, * TINSTAAPP * seemed to have a team that was in the lower-half according to PECOTA. In fact, the drafted team would have only provided an 8th place finish. Nonetheless, * TINSTAAPP * managed to nab just the right players, but no one that stands out. With the exclusion of the recruitment of Kendry Morales (34 HR, 108 RBI), the roster seems to be nicely fitted with all sorts of role players who hit less than 20 HRs or won less than 15 games. The transaction counter may provide a clue, as Matt add/dropped 48 players, which was fairly typical for our league. Instead, he made an amazing 170 activations, versus a league average of only 127. Importantly, the winner of the activations contest, which suggests playing daily matchups, was 2nd place finisher Team Los Del Rio with 325 start/bench moves. This also reveals that the deserved receipient of the The Faith In My Drafted Team Award should go to Jimmy, since Ong Rising made only three start/bench moves all season. Removing the extemes of Team Los Del Rio and the Ong Rising from the totals leaves a league average around 115 activations. Second place in this category belonged to Smooth Segues, but they finished in 6th in the standings versus an as-drafted finish of 5th, so perhaps there is a limit to what that method can achieve.
Let me conclude by awarding one more prize. Maykuu no Shoutai were projected to finished 3rd based on the PECOTA projections. My team as-drafted team would have finished in 3rd place. And in fact, I took home the bronze. Thus, I believe I deserve the Atlanta Braves Award for consistency that never leads to a championship.
12.18.2009
12.01.2009
2009 in Review (Part I)
For the past couple of seasons, I've compiled data from the BPGPL into a spreadsheet with the hope of using it to reach conclusions after the season. Each April, I lay our draft data out to tap the Baseball Prospectus projections to plot the expected results for all teams. In the past, I've forgotten about it by the time November rolled around. This year, I thought I would swap out the BP projections for the actual 2009 season results on a player-by-player basis to explore a couple of questions that are at the heart of fantasy baseball: (1) whose team 'outperformed' the most and which team 'underperformed' the most versus BP projections; and (2) how much does a good draft predict a good finish versus the intra-season roster moves. I will put some of the summary data on the league spreadsheet for anyone interested.
First, let’s review whose core team exceeded projections and whose team underperformed. I compiled projections using the BP data back in April under the assumption that the starting roster for each team would be the most expensive players drafted for each position and that each player would sit there the entire year. This fails to account for players taken at 'steal' prices that allowed paying more for a backup or for players who are very careful about substituting players on off-days, but I needed a simple methodology.
Let’s see where BP was simply wrong. PECOTA is based on playing time projections that are impossible to get exactly right. While they can use playing time and injury history to predict the future, this fails to account for new injuries, managerial decisions and trades, which drag down the results for select players. For our entire league, I found an average underperformance of 11% below the runs projection and 8% below the RBI projection and 6% below the stolen base projection . This is a simple average, but these are not rate stats, so it is applicable. Home runs were 3% lower than forecast and OBP was in-line with the forecast.
Table 1 lays out the average over/under-performance for the batting statistics of each team in order of projected finish. Across the majors, offense registered similar levels to 2008, so MLB as a whole was consistent with their recent history in terms of runs and HRs. As might be suspected, there were unheralded players who likely picked up some of that ‘missing’ offense. There are some pretty clear trends, however, on who got 'lucky' or 'unlucky' (or alternatively who was 'smart' or 'dumb') in picking players that outperformed the PECOTA projections.
The projections from the outset of the season featured the Boston Doodles of Cambridge and the Replacement Levelers tying for first place. The forecast included the Doodles dominating the hitting categories with Albert Pujols, David Wright, Hanley Ramirez and a number of 20-HR players, while giving up on Ks and Ws in favor of control-oriented pitchers who could keep the rate stats (ERA, WHIP, K/BB) competitive. No credit was given to major league-ready prospect Matt Wieters on the minor league roster since the team also had a $14 catcher in Geovany Soto. The actual results were disappointing – 18% fewer runs and 20% fewer HRs. For a team built around winning hitting categories, this was a devastating turn of events.. Despite another great year by Pujols who justified his $40 price tag, each of the other starters on the field provided less offense than could be reasonably expected. Absolutely no baseball analysts were suggesting that Wright ($29) and Soto ($14) would each hit less than half as many HRs as they did the prior season. Sub-par performances were also provided by Jay Bruce ($15 for 22 HRs, 47 Rs and 58 RBIs) and BJ Upton ($15 for 79 Rs and a .313 OBP).
Meanwhile, the Replacement Levelers kept hitting underperformance within the averages of the rest of the league. The aim was clearly to dominate in stolen bases, which the Levelers handily achieved with the league lead. However, the Levelers were principally a pitching-oriented team (based on the PECOTA projections). We'll take a look at the impact of the Leveler's pitching disappointments shortly.
Before looking at negative cases, take a peak at the second place Team Los Del Rio who managed to dramatically outperform the forecast. Team LDR started the season at a major disadvantage since Paul took over as manager and had slim pickings for keepers other than a handsomely priced Roy Halladay ($20). The team was built on some fairly high priced players such as Mark Teixeira ($35), Kevin Youkilis for ($22), Ichiro Suzuki ($20) and Jason Bay ($20). The bets paid off with career years by Teixeira (39 HR / 122 RBI / 103 R), Youkilis (27 / 94 / 99) and Bay (36 / 119 / 103) with Suzuki ( 88 R / 26 SB / .386 OBP) performing exactly as advertised. Russell Martin ($17) performed below expectations in every category despite playing a full season, but still had a better season than most catchers. Garrett Atkins ($17) significantly disappointed, but the price reflects widespread belief in our league that he was poised for a rebound, but clearly not every gamble must pay off to be successful. The hidden value came in the form of Troy Tulowitzki ($8) who doubled his projection with 32 HR and Raul Ibanez ($10) who BP envisioned hitting 21 HRs, but actually hit 34.
Meanwhile, league winner * TINSTAAPP * had a more disappointing offensive performance by its drafted players across most categories than the league average. Nonetheless, the team placed in the top ranks of every offensive category. Here, it is very clear that what the base roster failed to offer, Matt went out and found in free agency.
On the other side of the field, the league average pitching statistics did not waiver nearly as much as the offense. These were each rate statistics, so it is more difficult to calculate the averages as clearly, but it appears that each stat was within a 4% band of expectations for the entire league, but the standard deviation was much larger among the individual teams.
As their name might suggest, * TINSTAAPP * did not aggressively pursue young pitchers. Instead, the team went after unheralded veterans including Jamie Shields ($20), Jon Lester ($12), Ervin Santana ($11), John Danks ($10), and Ryan Dempster ($5). Santana (5.03 ERA / 1.48 WHIP / 107 K) was somewhat disappointing, but Lester almost exactly balanced that out by performing above expectations (3.41 ERA / 1.23 WHIP / 225 K). A look across the entire pitching staff reveals fewer than expected Wins, but a nice offset from higher than projected K/BB. Nonetheless, * TINSTAAPP * finished the season with the most points from pitching of any team. Similar to the team's offensive performance, the pitching stats imply shrewd use of free agency and the waiver wire.
The Replacement Levelers were expected to dominate all pitching categories with modest-priced pitchers including Brandon Webb ($23), Ricky Nolasco ($12), Chad Billingsley ($12), and Matt Cain ($9). Webb pitched all of four innings before his season ended with a shoulder injury, which can only be chalked up to bad luck. The abbreviated season of Chris Young ($3), a control pitcher who projected to pitch 140 innings with a sub-4.00, could not have helped either, as Young went down with a similar shoulder injury after just 76 innings. Meanwhile, Nolasco did not pitch like the #1 pitcher for a contender as he posted an ERA over 5.00. Further, Randy Johnson ($7) threw like a 45 year-old with under 100 innings and an ERA near 5.00. Cain's career year (2.89 ERA / 171 Ks / 14 Ws) was simply not enough. Taken the Levelers put 20% of their budget on four players who were far below the replacement level.
The pitching category suggests the difficulty of dealing with bad players when it comes to rate stats. Ong Rising sunk 40% of its budget into pitching, including Johan Santana ($30), C.C. Sabathia ($29), Chris Carpenter ($9), and Adam Wainwright ($8). Those four CY Young candidates each were expensive, yet performed at or better than expected. Add in a great year by Clayton Kershaw ($5), the youngest pitcher in baseball, and its a wonder that Ong Rising did not blow out the pitching category. It seems the drag of Kevin Slowey ($12), Brad Lidge ($4), and Fausto Carmona ($4), each of whom threw up horrible stats, was too much to bear, but its very difficult to drop pitchers who seem like they may turn it around after another start or two.
Circumspection of The Madison Mohels yields some interesting data. They put only 20% of their budget into pitching, with $33 of the $46 committed to Roy Oswalt ($23) and Justin Verlander ($10). I've always wondered if it would be possible to punt several categories entirely to ensure victory elsewhere. The Mohels hitting surely came through, but they were projected to be the worst pitching team, and they lived up to that billing. They stunk in pretty much every pitching category, except one, wins. Though I have not reviewed the roster additions and drops, this suggests a regular strategy of adding pitchers likely to win the next day's game, even if their rate stats could be poor. Combined with top stats in every hitting category, they achieved 5th place finish, which further suggests to me that our league may permit ignoring one category (SBs, Ks), but not several at once.
Lastly, let's review the worst of the worst -- PECOTA Monkeys. The team was projected by its namesake PECOTA to finish 8th in our league, but wound up in dead last by a wide margin. The team seems includes an all-star roster of every player that BP called out in print as a possible break-out all-star, but which PECOTA itself projected to be lackluster. The roster was stocked with crafty veterans who were supposed to have something left in the tank, such as Grady Siezemore ($37), Rafael Furcal ($13) and Carlos Delgado ($11) combined with up-and-comers including Stephen Drew ($13), Carlos Quentin ($15), Joba Chamberlin ($15), and Scott Kazmir ($15). Yet it would have been very easy to conclude that Dave's judgment was shot the second he bid $10 for Lastings Milledge.
This concludes Part I of the 2009 Review. This provided some insight into whose drafted players lived up to expectations and which team were bitten by bad luck. If I have time and there is interest, I will next take a look at the raw data of projections for the drafted team versus where each team finished to see if we can find any info on who had the best post-draft.
First, let’s review whose core team exceeded projections and whose team underperformed. I compiled projections using the BP data back in April under the assumption that the starting roster for each team would be the most expensive players drafted for each position and that each player would sit there the entire year. This fails to account for players taken at 'steal' prices that allowed paying more for a backup or for players who are very careful about substituting players on off-days, but I needed a simple methodology.
Let’s see where BP was simply wrong. PECOTA is based on playing time projections that are impossible to get exactly right. While they can use playing time and injury history to predict the future, this fails to account for new injuries, managerial decisions and trades, which drag down the results for select players. For our entire league, I found an average underperformance of 11% below the runs projection and 8% below the RBI projection and 6% below the stolen base projection . This is a simple average, but these are not rate stats, so it is applicable. Home runs were 3% lower than forecast and OBP was in-line with the forecast.
Table 1 lays out the average over/under-performance for the batting statistics of each team in order of projected finish. Across the majors, offense registered similar levels to 2008, so MLB as a whole was consistent with their recent history in terms of runs and HRs. As might be suspected, there were unheralded players who likely picked up some of that ‘missing’ offense. There are some pretty clear trends, however, on who got 'lucky' or 'unlucky' (or alternatively who was 'smart' or 'dumb') in picking players that outperformed the PECOTA projections.
The projections from the outset of the season featured the Boston Doodles of Cambridge and the Replacement Levelers tying for first place. The forecast included the Doodles dominating the hitting categories with Albert Pujols, David Wright, Hanley Ramirez and a number of 20-HR players, while giving up on Ks and Ws in favor of control-oriented pitchers who could keep the rate stats (ERA, WHIP, K/BB) competitive. No credit was given to major league-ready prospect Matt Wieters on the minor league roster since the team also had a $14 catcher in Geovany Soto. The actual results were disappointing – 18% fewer runs and 20% fewer HRs. For a team built around winning hitting categories, this was a devastating turn of events.. Despite another great year by Pujols who justified his $40 price tag, each of the other starters on the field provided less offense than could be reasonably expected. Absolutely no baseball analysts were suggesting that Wright ($29) and Soto ($14) would each hit less than half as many HRs as they did the prior season. Sub-par performances were also provided by Jay Bruce ($15 for 22 HRs, 47 Rs and 58 RBIs) and BJ Upton ($15 for 79 Rs and a .313 OBP).
Meanwhile, the Replacement Levelers kept hitting underperformance within the averages of the rest of the league. The aim was clearly to dominate in stolen bases, which the Levelers handily achieved with the league lead. However, the Levelers were principally a pitching-oriented team (based on the PECOTA projections). We'll take a look at the impact of the Leveler's pitching disappointments shortly.
Before looking at negative cases, take a peak at the second place Team Los Del Rio who managed to dramatically outperform the forecast. Team LDR started the season at a major disadvantage since Paul took over as manager and had slim pickings for keepers other than a handsomely priced Roy Halladay ($20). The team was built on some fairly high priced players such as Mark Teixeira ($35), Kevin Youkilis for ($22), Ichiro Suzuki ($20) and Jason Bay ($20). The bets paid off with career years by Teixeira (39 HR / 122 RBI / 103 R), Youkilis (27 / 94 / 99) and Bay (36 / 119 / 103) with Suzuki ( 88 R / 26 SB / .386 OBP) performing exactly as advertised. Russell Martin ($17) performed below expectations in every category despite playing a full season, but still had a better season than most catchers. Garrett Atkins ($17) significantly disappointed, but the price reflects widespread belief in our league that he was poised for a rebound, but clearly not every gamble must pay off to be successful. The hidden value came in the form of Troy Tulowitzki ($8) who doubled his projection with 32 HR and Raul Ibanez ($10) who BP envisioned hitting 21 HRs, but actually hit 34.
Meanwhile, league winner * TINSTAAPP * had a more disappointing offensive performance by its drafted players across most categories than the league average. Nonetheless, the team placed in the top ranks of every offensive category. Here, it is very clear that what the base roster failed to offer, Matt went out and found in free agency.
On the other side of the field, the league average pitching statistics did not waiver nearly as much as the offense. These were each rate statistics, so it is more difficult to calculate the averages as clearly, but it appears that each stat was within a 4% band of expectations for the entire league, but the standard deviation was much larger among the individual teams.
As their name might suggest, * TINSTAAPP * did not aggressively pursue young pitchers. Instead, the team went after unheralded veterans including Jamie Shields ($20), Jon Lester ($12), Ervin Santana ($11), John Danks ($10), and Ryan Dempster ($5). Santana (5.03 ERA / 1.48 WHIP / 107 K) was somewhat disappointing, but Lester almost exactly balanced that out by performing above expectations (3.41 ERA / 1.23 WHIP / 225 K). A look across the entire pitching staff reveals fewer than expected Wins, but a nice offset from higher than projected K/BB. Nonetheless, * TINSTAAPP * finished the season with the most points from pitching of any team. Similar to the team's offensive performance, the pitching stats imply shrewd use of free agency and the waiver wire.
The Replacement Levelers were expected to dominate all pitching categories with modest-priced pitchers including Brandon Webb ($23), Ricky Nolasco ($12), Chad Billingsley ($12), and Matt Cain ($9). Webb pitched all of four innings before his season ended with a shoulder injury, which can only be chalked up to bad luck. The abbreviated season of Chris Young ($3), a control pitcher who projected to pitch 140 innings with a sub-4.00, could not have helped either, as Young went down with a similar shoulder injury after just 76 innings. Meanwhile, Nolasco did not pitch like the #1 pitcher for a contender as he posted an ERA over 5.00. Further, Randy Johnson ($7) threw like a 45 year-old with under 100 innings and an ERA near 5.00. Cain's career year (2.89 ERA / 171 Ks / 14 Ws) was simply not enough. Taken the Levelers put 20% of their budget on four players who were far below the replacement level.
The pitching category suggests the difficulty of dealing with bad players when it comes to rate stats. Ong Rising sunk 40% of its budget into pitching, including Johan Santana ($30), C.C. Sabathia ($29), Chris Carpenter ($9), and Adam Wainwright ($8). Those four CY Young candidates each were expensive, yet performed at or better than expected. Add in a great year by Clayton Kershaw ($5), the youngest pitcher in baseball, and its a wonder that Ong Rising did not blow out the pitching category. It seems the drag of Kevin Slowey ($12), Brad Lidge ($4), and Fausto Carmona ($4), each of whom threw up horrible stats, was too much to bear, but its very difficult to drop pitchers who seem like they may turn it around after another start or two.
Circumspection of The Madison Mohels yields some interesting data. They put only 20% of their budget into pitching, with $33 of the $46 committed to Roy Oswalt ($23) and Justin Verlander ($10). I've always wondered if it would be possible to punt several categories entirely to ensure victory elsewhere. The Mohels hitting surely came through, but they were projected to be the worst pitching team, and they lived up to that billing. They stunk in pretty much every pitching category, except one, wins. Though I have not reviewed the roster additions and drops, this suggests a regular strategy of adding pitchers likely to win the next day's game, even if their rate stats could be poor. Combined with top stats in every hitting category, they achieved 5th place finish, which further suggests to me that our league may permit ignoring one category (SBs, Ks), but not several at once.
Lastly, let's review the worst of the worst -- PECOTA Monkeys. The team was projected by its namesake PECOTA to finish 8th in our league, but wound up in dead last by a wide margin. The team seems includes an all-star roster of every player that BP called out in print as a possible break-out all-star, but which PECOTA itself projected to be lackluster. The roster was stocked with crafty veterans who were supposed to have something left in the tank, such as Grady Siezemore ($37), Rafael Furcal ($13) and Carlos Delgado ($11) combined with up-and-comers including Stephen Drew ($13), Carlos Quentin ($15), Joba Chamberlin ($15), and Scott Kazmir ($15). Yet it would have been very easy to conclude that Dave's judgment was shot the second he bid $10 for Lastings Milledge.
This concludes Part I of the 2009 Review. This provided some insight into whose drafted players lived up to expectations and which team were bitten by bad luck. If I have time and there is interest, I will next take a look at the raw data of projections for the drafted team versus where each team finished to see if we can find any info on who had the best post-draft.
2009 Free Agent Purchases
Team Lose Del Rio: Andrew McCutchen at $2
Maykuu no Shouta: Alcides Escobar at $4
PECOTA Monkeys: Matt LaPorta at $5, John Maine at $1
Smooth Segues: Emilio Bonifacio at $1
Maykuu no Shouta: Alcides Escobar at $4
PECOTA Monkeys: Matt LaPorta at $5, John Maine at $1
Smooth Segues: Emilio Bonifacio at $1
2009 Final Standings
1. TINSTAAP ----------------------- 80.5
2. Team Los Del Rio --------------- 78
3. Maykuu no Shoutai -------------- 61.5
4. Red Hook Misdemeanors ---------- 61
5. Madison Mohels ----------------- 58.5
6. Smooth Segues ------------------ 54
7. Replacement Levelers ----------- 53
8. Boston Doodles of Cambridge ---- 50.5
9. Ong Rising --------------------- 28
10. PECOTA Monkeys ---------------- 25
(ESPN Final Standings)
2. Team Los Del Rio --------------- 78
3. Maykuu no Shoutai -------------- 61.5
4. Red Hook Misdemeanors ---------- 61
5. Madison Mohels ----------------- 58.5
6. Smooth Segues ------------------ 54
7. Replacement Levelers ----------- 53
8. Boston Doodles of Cambridge ---- 50.5
9. Ong Rising --------------------- 28
10. PECOTA Monkeys ---------------- 25
(ESPN Final Standings)
5.05.2009
YPIA Ineligibility List
As you may know, players who have already had the YPIA tag applied to them can never have it applied to them again. I am making a list here to document these players for reference purposes:
2010
Kemp
Gallardo
Mauer
F. Hernandez
Longoria
2009
Kinsler
Markakis
Lincecum
B.J. Upton
Hamels
Braun
Ellsbury
2008
Wright
H. Ramirez
Hart
Fielder
Reyes
2010
Kemp
Gallardo
Mauer
F. Hernandez
Longoria
2009
Kinsler
Markakis
Lincecum
B.J. Upton
Hamels
Braun
Ellsbury
2008
Wright
H. Ramirez
Hart
Fielder
Reyes
2009 Auction Results
The results from this screwy draft. I hope the blanks don't end up biting us in the butt.
Mike, Madison Mohels
Victor Martinez $9.00
Miguel Cabrera $40.00
Robinson Cano $7.00
Mark Reynolds $3.00
Jimmy Rollins $28.00
Derek Jeter $7.00
Ryan Howard $22.00
Bobby Abreu $20.00
Carlos Lee $27.00
Delmon Young $2.00
Hideki Matsui $5.00
Ken Griffey Jr. $2.00
Placido Polanco $4.00
Roy Oswalt $23.00
Jered Weaver $5.00
Joe Saunders $2.00
Bronson Arroyo $2.00
Huston Street $1.00
Brandon Lyon $1.00
Chris Capuano $1.00
Bartolo Colon $1.00
Justin Verlander$10.00
Jorge Cantu $2.00
Trevor Hoffman $1.00
Hank Blalock $3.00
Paul, Team Los Del Rio
Russell Martin $17.00
Mark Teixeira $35.00
Freddy Sanchez $1.00
Kevin Youkilis $22.00
Orlando Cabrera $1.00
Troy Tulowitzki $8.00
Garrett Atkins $17.00
Ichiro Suzuki $20.00
Jason Bay $20.00
Eric Byrnes $1.00
Raul Ibanez $10.00
Aaron Miles $1.00
Adam LaRoche $4.00
Roy Halladay $20.00
Felix Hernandez $24.00
Chien-Ming Wang $11.00
Jonathan Papelbon$6.00
Kerry Wood $5.00
Mark Buehrle $4.00
Ben Sheets $3.00
Carlos Marmol $3.00
Chad Cordero $1.00
Adam Lind $3.00
Erik Bedard $15.00
Josh Johnson ?
Justin, Makyuu no Shoutai
Mike Napoli $7.00
Prince Fielder $18.00
Kelly Johnson $15.00
Chipper Jones $20.00
Khalil Greene $1.00
Brian Roberts $21.00
Joey Votto $22.00
Nate McLouth $16.00
Chris Young $15.00
Shane Victorino ?
Rick Ankiel ?
Cody Ross $3.00
Jim Thome $7.00
Josh Beckett $18.00
A.J. Burnett $15.00
Derek Lowe $8.00
Javier Vazquez ?
Max Scherzer ?
Ted Lilly ?
Gil Meche $6.00
Wandy Rodriguez $3.00
Dave Bush $2.00
Andy Pettitte $1.00
Mark DeRosa $1.00
Ryan Doumit $3.00
James, Ong Rising
Chris Iannetta ?
Nick Swisher $5.00
Orlando Hudson $3.00
Adrian Beltre $7.00
Michael Young ?
Miguel Tejada $3.00
Carlos Guillen $6.00
Josh Hamilton $26.00
Matt Holliday $22.00
Curtis Granderson$16.00
Justin Upton $12.00
Vernon Wells $7.00
Xavier Nady $2.00
Johan Santana $30.00
CC Sabathia $29.00
Kevin Slowey $12.00
Chris Carpenter $9.00
Adam Wainwright $8.00
Clayton Kershaw $5.00
Brad Lidge $4.00
Fausto Carmona $4.00
Joe Nathan $3.00
Justin Duchscherer$2.00
Brett Meyers $1.00
Nick Swisher $1.00
Matt, * TINSTAAPP *
Jarrod Saltalamacchia$10.00
Adrian Gonzalez $17.00
Dustin Pedroia $15.00
Alex Gordon $12.00
Jhonny Peralta $9.00
Rickie Weeks $8.00
Conor Jackson $7.00
Jacoby Ellsbury $15.00
Ryan Braun $15.00
Alex Rios $16.00
Andre Ethier $15.00
Hunter Pence $11.00
David Ortiz $19.00
James Shields $20.00
Jon Lester $12.00
Ervin Santana $11.00
John Danks $10.00
Ryan Dempster $5.00
Joey Devine $2.00
Andy Sonnanstine$1.00
Ubaldo Jimenez $1.00
Joey Devine $2.00
Carlos Gomez $1.00
Grant Balfour $1.00
Ryan Zimmerman $10.00
Jeff, Smooth Segues
Brian McCann $16.00
Derrek Lee $13.00
Alexei Ramirez $15.00
Edwin Encarnacion$7.00
J.J. Hardy $7.00
Dan Uggla $15.00
Chris Davis $15.00
Alfonso Soriano $27.00
Adam Dunn $20.00
Mike Cameron $7.00
Nelson Cruz $10.00
Torii Hunter $15.00
Jack Cust $15.00
Cole Hamels $25.00
Dan Haren $25.00
Cliff Lee $11.00
John Smoltz $4.00
Justin Masterson$2.00
Hiroki Kuroda $1.00
Armando Galarraga$2.00
Jair Jurrjens $1.00
EMPTY ?
Paul Konerko ?
Jed Lowrie $1.00
James Loney $2.00
Brandon, Red Hook Misdemeanors
Joe Mauer $17.00
Justin Morneau $18.00
Brandon Phillips$17.00
Aramis Ramirez $18.00
Mike Aviles $6.00
Jose Lopez ?
Lance Berkman $30.00
Manny Ramirez $29.00
Magglio Ordonez $13.00
Vladimir Guerrero$17.00
Jayson Werth $7.00
J.D. Drew $6.00
Chone Figgins $8.00
Jake Peavy $29.00
Francisco Liriano$18.00
Francisco Rodriguez$4.00
Heath Bell $1.00
John Maine $3.00
Edinson Volquez $7.00
Carlos Zambrano $6.00
Kenshin Kawakami$1.00
Oliver Perez ?
Gavin Floyd $1.00
Aaron Rowand $1.00
Brett Walace ?
Tim Beckham $1.00
Dave, PECOTA Monkeys
Jorge Posada $3.00
Carlos Delgado $11.00
Chase Utley $29.00
Mike Lowell ?
Rafael Furcal $13.00
Stephen Drew $13.00
Nick Johnson $5.00
Carlos Quentin $15.00
Matt Kemp $15.00
Grady Sizemore $37.00
Johnny Damon $11.00
Adam Jones $10.00
Lastings Milledge$11.00
Yovani Gallardo $15.00
J.J. Putz $2.00
Matt Garza $11.00
Takashi Saito $4.00
Brad Penny $1.00
Joba Chamberlain$14.00
Scott Kazmir $15.00
Joakim Soria ?
Frank Francisco ?
Billy Butler $4.00
Jason Giambi $5.00
Trevor Cahill $1.00
Ryan, Boston Doodles of Cambridge
Geovany Soto $14.00
Albert Pujols $40.00
Howie Kendrick $7.00
David Wright $29.00
Hanley Ramirez $18.00
Felipe Lopez $7.00
Ian Stewart $3.00
B.J. Upton $15.00
Milton Bradley $8.00
Jay Bruce $15.00
Ryan Ludwick $10.00
Elijah Dukes $8.00
Chase Headley $1.00
Tim Lincenum $15.00
John Lackey $20.00
Daisuke Matsuzaka$11.00
Zack Greinke $11.00
Hong-Chih Kuo $3.00
Matt Capps $2.00
Jose Arredondo $1.00
Francisco Cordero$2.00
Rich Harden $14
Brandon Morrow $2.00
Brad Ziegler $1.00
Max Ramirez $2.00
Rich, Replacement Levelers
Kelly Shoppach $4.00
Carlos Pena $16.00
Ian Kinsler $15.00
Evan Longoria $15.00
Jose Reyes $18.00
Elvis Andrus $2.00
Todd Helton $1.00
Nick Markakis $15.00
Carlos Beltran $28.00
Corey Hart $17.00
Carl Crawford $15.00
Pat Burrell $12.00
Gary Sheffield $1.00
Ricky Nolasco $12.00
Brandon Webb $23.00
Mariano Rivera $2.00
Chris Young $3.00
Jonathan Sanchez$1.00
Kelvim Escobar $1.00
Chad Billingsley$12.00
Randy Johnson $7.00
Matt Cain $9.00
Alex Rodriguez $23.00
Edgar Renteria $1.00
Jonathan Sanchez$1.00
Mike, Madison Mohels
Victor Martinez $9.00
Miguel Cabrera $40.00
Robinson Cano $7.00
Mark Reynolds $3.00
Jimmy Rollins $28.00
Derek Jeter $7.00
Ryan Howard $22.00
Bobby Abreu $20.00
Carlos Lee $27.00
Delmon Young $2.00
Hideki Matsui $5.00
Ken Griffey Jr. $2.00
Placido Polanco $4.00
Roy Oswalt $23.00
Jered Weaver $5.00
Joe Saunders $2.00
Bronson Arroyo $2.00
Huston Street $1.00
Brandon Lyon $1.00
Chris Capuano $1.00
Bartolo Colon $1.00
Justin Verlander$10.00
Jorge Cantu $2.00
Trevor Hoffman $1.00
Hank Blalock $3.00
Paul, Team Los Del Rio
Russell Martin $17.00
Mark Teixeira $35.00
Freddy Sanchez $1.00
Kevin Youkilis $22.00
Orlando Cabrera $1.00
Troy Tulowitzki $8.00
Garrett Atkins $17.00
Ichiro Suzuki $20.00
Jason Bay $20.00
Eric Byrnes $1.00
Raul Ibanez $10.00
Aaron Miles $1.00
Adam LaRoche $4.00
Roy Halladay $20.00
Felix Hernandez $24.00
Chien-Ming Wang $11.00
Jonathan Papelbon$6.00
Kerry Wood $5.00
Mark Buehrle $4.00
Ben Sheets $3.00
Carlos Marmol $3.00
Chad Cordero $1.00
Adam Lind $3.00
Erik Bedard $15.00
Josh Johnson ?
Justin, Makyuu no Shoutai
Mike Napoli $7.00
Prince Fielder $18.00
Kelly Johnson $15.00
Chipper Jones $20.00
Khalil Greene $1.00
Brian Roberts $21.00
Joey Votto $22.00
Nate McLouth $16.00
Chris Young $15.00
Shane Victorino ?
Rick Ankiel ?
Cody Ross $3.00
Jim Thome $7.00
Josh Beckett $18.00
A.J. Burnett $15.00
Derek Lowe $8.00
Javier Vazquez ?
Max Scherzer ?
Ted Lilly ?
Gil Meche $6.00
Wandy Rodriguez $3.00
Dave Bush $2.00
Andy Pettitte $1.00
Mark DeRosa $1.00
Ryan Doumit $3.00
James, Ong Rising
Chris Iannetta ?
Nick Swisher $5.00
Orlando Hudson $3.00
Adrian Beltre $7.00
Michael Young ?
Miguel Tejada $3.00
Carlos Guillen $6.00
Josh Hamilton $26.00
Matt Holliday $22.00
Curtis Granderson$16.00
Justin Upton $12.00
Vernon Wells $7.00
Xavier Nady $2.00
Johan Santana $30.00
CC Sabathia $29.00
Kevin Slowey $12.00
Chris Carpenter $9.00
Adam Wainwright $8.00
Clayton Kershaw $5.00
Brad Lidge $4.00
Fausto Carmona $4.00
Joe Nathan $3.00
Justin Duchscherer$2.00
Brett Meyers $1.00
Nick Swisher $1.00
Matt, * TINSTAAPP *
Jarrod Saltalamacchia$10.00
Adrian Gonzalez $17.00
Dustin Pedroia $15.00
Alex Gordon $12.00
Jhonny Peralta $9.00
Rickie Weeks $8.00
Conor Jackson $7.00
Jacoby Ellsbury $15.00
Ryan Braun $15.00
Alex Rios $16.00
Andre Ethier $15.00
Hunter Pence $11.00
David Ortiz $19.00
James Shields $20.00
Jon Lester $12.00
Ervin Santana $11.00
John Danks $10.00
Ryan Dempster $5.00
Joey Devine $2.00
Andy Sonnanstine$1.00
Ubaldo Jimenez $1.00
Joey Devine $2.00
Carlos Gomez $1.00
Grant Balfour $1.00
Ryan Zimmerman $10.00
Jeff, Smooth Segues
Brian McCann $16.00
Derrek Lee $13.00
Alexei Ramirez $15.00
Edwin Encarnacion$7.00
J.J. Hardy $7.00
Dan Uggla $15.00
Chris Davis $15.00
Alfonso Soriano $27.00
Adam Dunn $20.00
Mike Cameron $7.00
Nelson Cruz $10.00
Torii Hunter $15.00
Jack Cust $15.00
Cole Hamels $25.00
Dan Haren $25.00
Cliff Lee $11.00
John Smoltz $4.00
Justin Masterson$2.00
Hiroki Kuroda $1.00
Armando Galarraga$2.00
Jair Jurrjens $1.00
EMPTY ?
Paul Konerko ?
Jed Lowrie $1.00
James Loney $2.00
Brandon, Red Hook Misdemeanors
Joe Mauer $17.00
Justin Morneau $18.00
Brandon Phillips$17.00
Aramis Ramirez $18.00
Mike Aviles $6.00
Jose Lopez ?
Lance Berkman $30.00
Manny Ramirez $29.00
Magglio Ordonez $13.00
Vladimir Guerrero$17.00
Jayson Werth $7.00
J.D. Drew $6.00
Chone Figgins $8.00
Jake Peavy $29.00
Francisco Liriano$18.00
Francisco Rodriguez$4.00
Heath Bell $1.00
John Maine $3.00
Edinson Volquez $7.00
Carlos Zambrano $6.00
Kenshin Kawakami$1.00
Oliver Perez ?
Gavin Floyd $1.00
Aaron Rowand $1.00
Brett Walace ?
Tim Beckham $1.00
Dave, PECOTA Monkeys
Jorge Posada $3.00
Carlos Delgado $11.00
Chase Utley $29.00
Mike Lowell ?
Rafael Furcal $13.00
Stephen Drew $13.00
Nick Johnson $5.00
Carlos Quentin $15.00
Matt Kemp $15.00
Grady Sizemore $37.00
Johnny Damon $11.00
Adam Jones $10.00
Lastings Milledge$11.00
Yovani Gallardo $15.00
J.J. Putz $2.00
Matt Garza $11.00
Takashi Saito $4.00
Brad Penny $1.00
Joba Chamberlain$14.00
Scott Kazmir $15.00
Joakim Soria ?
Frank Francisco ?
Billy Butler $4.00
Jason Giambi $5.00
Trevor Cahill $1.00
Ryan, Boston Doodles of Cambridge
Geovany Soto $14.00
Albert Pujols $40.00
Howie Kendrick $7.00
David Wright $29.00
Hanley Ramirez $18.00
Felipe Lopez $7.00
Ian Stewart $3.00
B.J. Upton $15.00
Milton Bradley $8.00
Jay Bruce $15.00
Ryan Ludwick $10.00
Elijah Dukes $8.00
Chase Headley $1.00
Tim Lincenum $15.00
John Lackey $20.00
Daisuke Matsuzaka$11.00
Zack Greinke $11.00
Hong-Chih Kuo $3.00
Matt Capps $2.00
Jose Arredondo $1.00
Francisco Cordero$2.00
Rich Harden $14
Brandon Morrow $2.00
Brad Ziegler $1.00
Max Ramirez $2.00
Rich, Replacement Levelers
Kelly Shoppach $4.00
Carlos Pena $16.00
Ian Kinsler $15.00
Evan Longoria $15.00
Jose Reyes $18.00
Elvis Andrus $2.00
Todd Helton $1.00
Nick Markakis $15.00
Carlos Beltran $28.00
Corey Hart $17.00
Carl Crawford $15.00
Pat Burrell $12.00
Gary Sheffield $1.00
Ricky Nolasco $12.00
Brandon Webb $23.00
Mariano Rivera $2.00
Chris Young $3.00
Jonathan Sanchez$1.00
Kelvim Escobar $1.00
Chad Billingsley$12.00
Randy Johnson $7.00
Matt Cain $9.00
Alex Rodriguez $23.00
Edgar Renteria $1.00
Jonathan Sanchez$1.00
4.17.2009
Party Like It's 1999
During a recent trip through the pages of baseball-reference.com, I came across a very interesting anomaly.
It was a stark and obvious statistical aberration that I had never noticed before, and it led me to similar discrepancies that in turn led to some questions. Before I pose them, let me present the information.
Cal Ripken, Jr. is a career .276 hitter. During the 1990s, he progressed through his 30s with numbers that were fairly consistent with his overall totals:
Year Age PA AVG OPS
1990 29 695 .250 .756
1991 30 717 .323 .940
1992 31 715 .251 .689
1993 32 718 .257 .748
1994** 33 484 .315 .823
1995 34 613 .262 .745
1996 35 707 .278 .807
1997 36 686 .270 .703
1998 37 659 .271 .721
1999 38 354 .340 .952
2000 39 339 .256 .763
2001 40 516 .239 .637
*OPS= On base % + Slugging %
**strike-shortened season
In looking at these numbers, there is one exception that stands out. In 1999, at the advanced age of 38, Cal Ripken Jr. posted career highs in batting average and OPS.
His average took a 70 point leap from the previous season, and his OPS skyrocketed by more than 200 points. At an age where most players are retired or serving as reserves, Ripken had the best offensive output of his entire career. A .340 average!
Now the first thing that should come to mind is,
"Yeah, but he only had about half of the typical number of plate appearances."
That's correct- 1999 was the first season in which Ripken sustained serious injuries. It marked the end of "the streak" as he sat out most of April, half of May, and all of August. And it could be that the diminished sample size (i.e. fewer plate appearances) accounts for why he was able to sustain such a high output.
However, a discrepancy of this size is pretty unusual, even for a guy like Ripken who had previously enjoyed a handful of "boom seasons" where his totals spiked to exceed his typical performance (e.g. 1991).
Moreover, the man was 38 years old with an unprecedented amount of mileage on him. It was by any measure an odd time to have the best performance of one's life.
And there's more. Looking at Ripken's splits for 1999, an interesting pattern emerges.
April: .179 avg/ .457 OPS
May: .279 avg/ .897 OPS
June: .352 avg/ .945 OPS
July: .413 avg/ 1.179 OPS
Sept/ Oct: .365 avg/ .961 OPS
(To put this perspective, an OPS of greater than .900 is typically the realm of elite hitters like Albert Pujols.)
Ripken was hobbled in April and early May, during which he played a combined 24 games. Yet when he returned from injury he almost immediately began performing at a level that exceeded anything he had previosuly done at the plate.
Just as suddenly, he was injured again, missing all of August. And yet his second return, in September, was just as successful.
___________________________________
What's my point?
In looking at these numbers, I found myself asking this question:
How does a 38 year old man with a lot of wear and tear suddenly bust out his best offensive showing ever, despite being seriously injured for the first time in his career?
Thinking about that question led me to this one:
Is it meaningful that this happened in 1999, the year after McGwire and Sosa combined for 113 home runs?
I know, I know...to even consider that a baseball Golden Boy like the Ironman did something to aid his performance or recovery is tantamount to blasphemy...but nevertheless, the increase in production is pretty damn large to be accounted for by a "hot streak" or some other natural variance.
In an attempt to explain it, I began looking at other players. In the same year, Rickey Henderson, another future Hall of Fame superstar, turned 40. Despite reaching that milestone, Henderson enjoyed an amazing offensive resurgence of his own as evidenced by the numbers below:
Year Age OPS
1996 37 .754
1997 38 .742
1998 39 .723
1999 40 .889
2000 41 .673
2001 42 .717
2002 43 .721
2003 44 .627
With the exception of the final two years, Henderson had 400+ plate appearances in each season, providing large enough sample sizes for comparison purposes. Note that his OPS in 1999 was his highest since the end of his "prime" (age 34) in 1993.
Rickey's OPS jumped more than 160 points from 1998 to 1999, yet immediately dropped back down the following year.
Again, I was forced to ask myself a question:
How does a 40 man suddenly elevate his offensive production to a level not seen since his prime?
My first thought was that perhaps offense in general was up that year. Many of you may recall discussions about the baseball being "juiced". Could there have been an overall increase in offensive production?
In the National League (where Rickey was playing), both runs and home runs did increase substantially from 1998 to 1999. However, those global totals stayed higher in 2000 and 2001 as well...Rickey's individual performace did not.
This seems to suggest that his offensive spike was not necessarily a result of league-wide production.
In the American League, there was no significant increase in offense at all. 1999 run and home run totals were consistent with the numbers throughout the 90s, as well as the totals posted in 2000 and 2001.
Again, this suggests that Ripken's numbers cannot be attributed to some larger phenomenon.
So if Ripken's and Henderson's aberrant performance cannot be accounted for by overall trends, and if they're too extreme to be reflective of random variations in performance, how can they be explained? Two players, both at ages that typically involve substantial declines, suddenly bust out. And there may be others beyond these two- I'm still checking through the numbers.
To be clear, I'm not accusing Ripken or Henderson of using PEDs. But the numbers are very interesting. Could it be a coincidence? Sure. But the timing, the patterns, the ages...it makes me wonder. We're in a time where every "power hitter" is under suspicion and scrutiny. Should we not examine other players as well? At the least, it's an interesting phenomenon worth a long look.
It was a stark and obvious statistical aberration that I had never noticed before, and it led me to similar discrepancies that in turn led to some questions. Before I pose them, let me present the information.
Cal Ripken, Jr. is a career .276 hitter. During the 1990s, he progressed through his 30s with numbers that were fairly consistent with his overall totals:
Year Age PA AVG OPS
1990 29 695 .250 .756
1991 30 717 .323 .940
1992 31 715 .251 .689
1993 32 718 .257 .748
1994** 33 484 .315 .823
1995 34 613 .262 .745
1996 35 707 .278 .807
1997 36 686 .270 .703
1998 37 659 .271 .721
1999 38 354 .340 .952
2000 39 339 .256 .763
2001 40 516 .239 .637
*OPS= On base % + Slugging %
**strike-shortened season
In looking at these numbers, there is one exception that stands out. In 1999, at the advanced age of 38, Cal Ripken Jr. posted career highs in batting average and OPS.
His average took a 70 point leap from the previous season, and his OPS skyrocketed by more than 200 points. At an age where most players are retired or serving as reserves, Ripken had the best offensive output of his entire career. A .340 average!
Now the first thing that should come to mind is,
"Yeah, but he only had about half of the typical number of plate appearances."
That's correct- 1999 was the first season in which Ripken sustained serious injuries. It marked the end of "the streak" as he sat out most of April, half of May, and all of August. And it could be that the diminished sample size (i.e. fewer plate appearances) accounts for why he was able to sustain such a high output.
However, a discrepancy of this size is pretty unusual, even for a guy like Ripken who had previously enjoyed a handful of "boom seasons" where his totals spiked to exceed his typical performance (e.g. 1991).
Moreover, the man was 38 years old with an unprecedented amount of mileage on him. It was by any measure an odd time to have the best performance of one's life.
And there's more. Looking at Ripken's splits for 1999, an interesting pattern emerges.
April: .179 avg/ .457 OPS
May: .279 avg/ .897 OPS
June: .352 avg/ .945 OPS
July: .413 avg/ 1.179 OPS
Sept/ Oct: .365 avg/ .961 OPS
(To put this perspective, an OPS of greater than .900 is typically the realm of elite hitters like Albert Pujols.)
Ripken was hobbled in April and early May, during which he played a combined 24 games. Yet when he returned from injury he almost immediately began performing at a level that exceeded anything he had previosuly done at the plate.
Just as suddenly, he was injured again, missing all of August. And yet his second return, in September, was just as successful.
___________________________________
What's my point?
In looking at these numbers, I found myself asking this question:
How does a 38 year old man with a lot of wear and tear suddenly bust out his best offensive showing ever, despite being seriously injured for the first time in his career?
Thinking about that question led me to this one:
Is it meaningful that this happened in 1999, the year after McGwire and Sosa combined for 113 home runs?
I know, I know...to even consider that a baseball Golden Boy like the Ironman did something to aid his performance or recovery is tantamount to blasphemy...but nevertheless, the increase in production is pretty damn large to be accounted for by a "hot streak" or some other natural variance.
In an attempt to explain it, I began looking at other players. In the same year, Rickey Henderson, another future Hall of Fame superstar, turned 40. Despite reaching that milestone, Henderson enjoyed an amazing offensive resurgence of his own as evidenced by the numbers below:
Year Age OPS
1996 37 .754
1997 38 .742
1998 39 .723
1999 40 .889
2000 41 .673
2001 42 .717
2002 43 .721
2003 44 .627
With the exception of the final two years, Henderson had 400+ plate appearances in each season, providing large enough sample sizes for comparison purposes. Note that his OPS in 1999 was his highest since the end of his "prime" (age 34) in 1993.
Rickey's OPS jumped more than 160 points from 1998 to 1999, yet immediately dropped back down the following year.
Again, I was forced to ask myself a question:
How does a 40 man suddenly elevate his offensive production to a level not seen since his prime?
My first thought was that perhaps offense in general was up that year. Many of you may recall discussions about the baseball being "juiced". Could there have been an overall increase in offensive production?
In the National League (where Rickey was playing), both runs and home runs did increase substantially from 1998 to 1999. However, those global totals stayed higher in 2000 and 2001 as well...Rickey's individual performace did not.
This seems to suggest that his offensive spike was not necessarily a result of league-wide production.
In the American League, there was no significant increase in offense at all. 1999 run and home run totals were consistent with the numbers throughout the 90s, as well as the totals posted in 2000 and 2001.
Again, this suggests that Ripken's numbers cannot be attributed to some larger phenomenon.
So if Ripken's and Henderson's aberrant performance cannot be accounted for by overall trends, and if they're too extreme to be reflective of random variations in performance, how can they be explained? Two players, both at ages that typically involve substantial declines, suddenly bust out. And there may be others beyond these two- I'm still checking through the numbers.
To be clear, I'm not accusing Ripken or Henderson of using PEDs. But the numbers are very interesting. Could it be a coincidence? Sure. But the timing, the patterns, the ages...it makes me wonder. We're in a time where every "power hitter" is under suspicion and scrutiny. Should we not examine other players as well? At the least, it's an interesting phenomenon worth a long look.
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